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NO. 40 JUNE 2021 Introduction 
Repression and Autocracy as Russia 
Heads into State Duma Elections 
Sabine Fischer 
Russia is experiencing a wave of state repression ahead of parliamentary elections on 
19 September 2021. The crackdown is unusually harsh and broad, extending into pre-
viously unaffected areas and increasingly penetrating the private sphere of Russian 
citizens. For years the Russian state had largely relied on the so-called “power verti-
cal” and on controlling the information space through propaganda and marginalisa-
tion of independent media. The political leadership, so it would appear, no longer 
regards such measures as sufficient to secure its power and is increasingly resorting 
to repression. The upshot is a further hardening of autocracy. Even German NGOs are 
experiencing growing pressure from the Russian state. This trend cannot be expected 
to slow, still less reverse in the foreseeable future. 
 
Repression – wherever it occurs – involves 
restrictions (of civil rights and liberties) and 
physical violence. Russia has seen a string 
of political assassinations and assassination 
attempts over the past decades. The poison-
ing of Alexei Navalny is only the most 
recent case, following on the spectacular 
murder of Boris Nemtsov in February 2015 
and numerous other attacks at home and 
abroad. In Russia’s Chechen Republic, 
Ramzan Kadyrov has entrenched violence 
against opponents and civil society as the 
foundation of his power. 
Few of these crimes have been properly 
investigated, and the Russian state denies 
any involvement or responsibility. Security 
forces crush protests. Torture is common-
place in Russian prisons. Civil rights and 
liberties are heavily curtailed. Both forms 
of repression – restrictions and violence – 
have increased noticeably in recent months. 
The state continues to rely primarily on the 
former but has also expanded its use of the 
latter. 
What Is New? 
Three aspects are new. The measures are, 
firstly, much larger-scale. During the 
nationwide demonstrations in late January 
and early February 2021 alone more than 
11,500 individuals were detained. Protestors 
were subjected to violence and detainees’ 
rights were violated. The security forces also 
cracked down on journalists. 
Since January several thousand adminis-
trative penalties have been issued in con-
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nection with the protests. The proportion 
of “administrative detentions” (compared to 
fines) has jumped in comparison to earlier 
years. More than 130 criminal investiga-
tions have been initiated and a number of 
long prison sentences already imposed. 
The “offences” included participation in 
unauthorised demonstrations, violation of 
administrative and Covid prevention rules, 
and inciting minors to join protests. Action 
against social media likes and reposts about 
the protests has also been stepped up. The 
human rights organisation OVD-Info, which 
documents abuses and provides legal sup-
port, states that: “The scale of detentions, 
administrative and criminal prosecution in 
connection with the protests in January-
February 2021 is undoubtedly the largest 
in the entire history of modern Russia.” 
The protests were triggered by the deten-
tion of opposition politician Alexei Navalny 
after he returned to Moscow on 17 January 
2021. On 2 February a Moscow court sen-
tenced him to two years and eight months 
imprisonment for violating parole from 
an earlier sentence – which the European 
Court of Human Rights had already declared 
politically motivated and called on the Rus-
sian government to rescind. 
State institutions and Navalny’s nation-
wide teams published widely diverging 
estimates of the size of the demonstrations 
between January and April. Photographs 
prove that thousands of people took to the 
streets on 23 and 31 January in more than 
120 Russian cities. These were thus the 
biggest demonstrations since the mass pro-
tests against election fraud in 2011/12. 
Secondly, repression has expanded to tar-
get organisations and groups that were pre-
viously largely untouched. The arrest of 
the well-known lawyer Ivan Pavlov on accu-
sations of disclosing confidential informa-
tion caused consternation, for example. 
Pavlov is the head of Team 29, a group of 
lawyers working to uphold civil rights that 
also represented Navalny’s Anti-Corruption 
Foundation (Fond Borby s Korruptsii, FBK). 
His arrest was understood as signalling 
an expansion of state repression to include 
lawyers. In mid-April the Moscow state 
prosecutor applied to have the FBK and 
other organisations associated with Navalny 
designated as “extremist organisations”. In 
parallel the State Duma amended the law 
on “extremist organisations” which now 
prevents their members from standing in 
elections (even if their membership ended 
before designation). On 9 June the FBK, 
Navalny’s regional offices and his Citizens’ 
Rights Protection Foundation were – as 
expected – classified as “extremist”, with 
far-reaching political and legal consequenc-
es not only for activists but potentially also 
for hundreds of thousands of private donors. 
Anticipating this outcome, FBK had already 
dissolved its nationwide structures on 29 
April to shield its staff. 
Independent media have also come under 
pressure. Three editors of the student news-
paper DOXA were charged in mid-April with 
inciting minors to participate in the pro-
Navalny protests and have been under 
house arrest since then. In May two promi-
nent independent Russian-language media 
outlets, Meduza and V-Times, were declared 
“foreign agents”. 
More than ninety organisations are cur-
rently classified as “foreign agents” and face 
existential challenges. They are required to 
display the designation prominently in all 
public statements, with the intention of 
discrediting them. They are also subject to 
heightened bureaucratic scrutiny, which 
ties up time and resources and is especially 
burdensome for smaller organisations and 
natural persons. The label deters Russian 
donors and targeted entities quickly find 
themselves in existential financial difficul-
ties. Meduza responded with 
a crowdfunding campaign that attracted 
80,000 donors within the space of just a few 
days. Other media, organisations and 
individuals lack such capacities. V-Times 
announced on 3 June that it was closing 
down. The state campaign 
against Meduza, V-Times and DOXA repre-
sents a bitter setback for Russia’s inde-
pendent media landscape. 
 SWP Comment 40 
 June 2021 
 3 
Thirdly, in a departure from previous prac-
tice, the state is increasingly encroaching 
on the private sphere and turning its atten-
tion to the politically unorganised. Since 
the protests at the beginning of the year 
hundreds of citizens across the country 
have been visited by the security forces at 
home or work and warned, summonsed, 
fined or detained. Moscow’s public CCTV 
systems have been used for large-scale 
facial recognition for the first time. These 
measures also affect citizens who did not 
actually participate in the protests, with 
security forces questioning neighbours 
and family members. Numerous dismissals 
across the country were apparently asso-
ciated with participation in or mobilisation 
for the protests. The most spectacular case 
involved about one hundred employees 
of the Moscow metro, who lost their jobs 
in mid-May for supporting the protests. 
The repression has been accompanied 
by a wave of new legislation designed 
to hamper opposition and civil society 
activities and expand the state’s scope for 
repression. At the end of 2020 it was made 
possible to designate natural persons as 
“foreign agents” if they receive financial 
support from abroad. The right to demon-
strate has been further curtailed and new 
possibilities have been created to suppress 
political speech in the internet and social 
media. A new law on education came into 
effect at the beginning of June to control 
the discussion and dissemination of politi-
cal issues in education, training and scien-
tific contexts, as well as international 
research collaborations. The laws on “ex-
tremist” and “undesirable” organisations 
were also drastically toughened in June. 
All the while the pressure on opposition 
politicians grows. Many have left the coun-
try, most recently the former Duma deputy 
Dmitry Gudkov. As the expanding extent 
and changing quality of state repression in 
recent months demonstrates, the state is no 
longer limiting itself to clamping down on 
prominent opponents. 
Why Now? 
The proximate cause of the clampdown is 
the Duma election on 19 September 2021. 
The state is bulldozing anything that could 
be regarded as a political alternative to the 
ailing ruling party United Russia. 
The root cause, however, is the protracted 
legitimacy crisis of the Russian political 
system. Its roots lie in the simultaneity of 
societal modernisation and political auto-
cratisation that has characterised the rela-
tionship between state and society since 
the 2000s. The contradictions were initially 
masked by economic growth and increasing 
prosperity. That phase ended with the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008/09 and the suppression 
of mass protests during the 2011/12 Duma 
and presidential elections. 
Traditionalism, nationalism, strong 
leadership and geopolitical confrontation 
with the West became the central legitimis-
ing narrative of the Russian state after 
Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin in 
2012 and annexed the Crimea in 2014. 
The wave of patriotism generated by the 
“Crimea effect” lasted only four years. The 
pension reform announced in summer 
2018 was widely regarded as the state ulti-
mately tearing up the implicit “social 
contract” that had offered material security 
in return for political passivity. Since then, 
the oscillation of public protest and state 
repression has grown increasingly fierce. 
Notable protests occurred in summer 2019 
in Moscow around the City Duma election 
and from July 2020 in Khabarovsk after the 
sacking and detention of Governor Sergei 
Furgal. The protests of winter and spring 
2021 represent the continuation and pro-
visional culmination of this development. 
Moreover, the sharpening legitimacy 
crisis sees the state increasingly concerned 
for its stability. So far it has failed to foster 
other sources of legitimacy and appears 
incapable of dealing with political dissent. 
But the widely postulated fear stalking 
Russia's rulers should not be overstated. 
The state ultimately trusts in the proven 
effectiveness of its instruments. From the 
perspective of the political leadership, for 
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example, the repression of 2011/12 was a 
success, with the protests ebbing rapidly 
away after the showdown on Bolotnaya 
Square in May 2012. 
The current dynamic of repression is 
largely characterised by two contextual 
factors that have ramped up the domestic 
political temperature since 2020. For a time 
the Covid-19 pandemic appeared to threaten 
the constitutional reform designed to se-
cure the existing political system and keep 
Putin in the presidency. The virus over-
shadowed the entire year, affected the Rus-
sian economy and – although the official 
figures are much lower – likely 
cost several hundred thousand lives. 
But the real political bombshell of 2020 
was the political crisis in neighbouring 
Belarus. From the very outset its protest 
movement became a sounding board for 
the hopes and fears of Russia’s rulers and 
opposition alike. The Kremlin quickly 
backed Belarusian President Alexander 
Lukashenko and indicated that “regime 
change” in Minsk was a red line. The 
“autocratic alliance” between Moscow and 
Minsk now appears permanent. The fall 
of Lukashenko, who wages war on his own 
population, would represent a bitter defeat 
and create a fatal precedent for Moscow. 
The two countries’ domestic politics are 
now more closely intertwined than ever. 
Effectiveness and Consequences of 
the Latest Repression 
From the state’s perspective the repression of 
the first half of 2021 is already a “success”. 
The latest surveys by the independent Levada 
Centre show willingness to protest declin-
ing significantly since January, while sup-
port for those who took to the streets has also 
fallen. Navalny’s public recognition has risen 
since August 2020 – but not his political 
support. He is in prison, many of his closest 
collaborators have fled abroad, and his orga-
nisations are hamstrung by court verdicts 
and new legislation. Navalny and his col-
laborators will find it difficult to pursue 
their political goals under these conditions. 
Putin’s approval by contrast is back at 67 
percent after a pandemic-related slump to 
59 percent in spring 2020. That trend is ex-
pedited by an official narrative that the 
pandemic has been defeated, along with the 
lifting of many restrictions even during the 
second wave in autumn and winter 2020/21. 
That does nothing to change the ongoing 
legitimacy crisis, which divides Russian 
society into a slowly growing dissatisfied 
minority that is willing to protest and a 
declining majority who continue to support 
the political system – however reticently – 
out of traditionalism, resignation or fear of 
change. Surveys must be interpreted with 
the utmost caution in authoritarian con-
texts like the Russian, however. It is quite 
possible that respondents will play down 
their criticisms for fear of repercussions, 
even in anonymous surveys. If that were 
the case Levada’s figures, which point to 
about 35 percent dissatisfaction, would be 
an underestimate. 
The Russian state’s repression strategy 
leverages this social polarisation by boost-
ing anti-liberal and anti-Western propaganda 
directed towards the traditionalist and/or 
change-averse majority while increasingly 
vigorously suppressing and silencing the 
critical minority willing to protest. The 
political leadership can even expect repres-
sion of the minority to earn it new legiti-
macy among sections of the majority by 
“protecting” them from dreaded instability. 
It is hard to predict where this process will 
lead. Much depends on whether the next 
generation of activists choose to move ab-
road or withdraw from politics – or con-
tinue to work to change the country from 
within despite growing risks. Willingness 
to emigrate has certainly increased steadily 
over the past decade. 
Phases of repression also alter the politi-
cal system. They strengthen the actors 
of repression, in the sense of granting the 
security forces greater sway within the 
power apparatus. In this way repression 
creates structural realities that are difficult 
to reverse. Here again this continues a trend 
of the past decade, which has seen the power 
of the security services steadily expanding. 
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Social change is held back by state policies 
designed to shore up power. Dissent is sup-
pressed by ever harsher means: fragmented, 
atomised and neutralised. This mechanism 
also functions at the level of the political 
elites, whose members can regularly find 
themselves in the sights of political repres-
sion. 
The interlocking dynamics in Russia and 
Belarus leave little grounds for hope of Mos-
cow (or Minsk) dropping broad repression 
as an increasingly central instrument of 
power. Given that Moscow unconditionally 
supports Lukaschenko’s suppression of 
the Belarusian popular movement, the big 
question is whether Russia eventually might 
go down the Belarusian path. In any case 
the latest developments are associated with 
a clear hardening of Russian autocracy that 
makes opening and compromise – whether 
internal or external – unlikely for the in-
definite future. 
Transnational Repression – Ger-
man Organisations also Affected 
On 26 May 2021 the Russian prosecutor 
general designated three German NGOs 
“undesirable”: the German-Russian Ex-
change (DRA), the Centre for Liberal Moder-
nity (LibMod) and the Forum of Russian-
Speaking Europeans. The Berlin-based Euro-
pean Platform for Democratic Elections 
(EPDE) had already received the label in 
2018. The 2015 law on “undesirable organi-
sations” prohibits non-Russian organisa-
tions that supposedly threaten the Russian 
state from operating within Russia. The law 
was significantly tightened to coincide with 
the listing of the three German organisa-
tions. It allows members of designated orga-
nisations to be prevented from entering 
the country and puts Russian citizens and 
residents who cooperate with them under 
the risk of criminal prosecution. 
The Russian ministry of justice currently 
lists 34 foreign organisations as undesir-
able. Seventeen – or half – are American. 
But they also include a string of European 
organisations such as the European Endow-
ment for Democracy. Designated organisa-
tions are forced to cease all work in Russia 
immediately in order to avoid further 
endangering their Russian partners. This 
makes the latter’s situation even more 
precarious, as the number of foreign part-
ners and funding sources declines. 
EPDE, DRA and LibMod are participants 
in the German-Russian Petersburg Dialogue. 
By banning them, the Russian leadership is 
signalling that its efforts to eliminate criti-
cism and dissent will make no exceptions 
even for such a venerable dialogue project. 
There are indications from the Russian 
State Duma that German party-political 
foundations could also be targeted, specifi-
cally mentioning the Green-affiliated Hein-
rich Böll Foundation. The German side of 
the Petersburg Dialogue has suspended all 
joint activities until further notice, making 
their resumption conditional on delisting. 
Moscow’s action against German NGOs 
underlines the isolationist tendencies in 
Russian foreign policy and demonstrates 
the drastic deterioration in German-Russian 
relations since autumn 2020. The political 
crisis in Belarus and the Navalny poisoning 
have further chilled an already frosty rela-
tionship. The next German government 
will have to base its Russia policy on the 
assumption that the domestic political 
hardening will make understanding and 
compromise with Moscow even more 
difficult. At the same time this creates an 
almost unsolvable conflict of goals for Ger-
man and European Russia policy: 
The EU’s five guiding principles for rela-
tions with Russia are designed to deter 
Russian transgressions at all levels, in the 
shared neighbourhood and towards the EU 
and its member states. They also seek to 
encourage and develop people to people 
contacts with Russian society. But the nega-
tive dynamic at the political level of the 
relationship severely narrows the possibili-
ties, especially where Moscow is doing 
everything to isolate Russian society. This 
undercuts the EU’s fifth principle, people-
to-people contacts and support for civil 
society. The banning of German NGOs and 
suppression of the Petersburg Dialogue 
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demonstrate this very clearly. Germany and 
the EU have already had to adapt their co-
operation with Russian civil society to in-
creasingly restrictive conditions and operate 
with extreme sensitivity to the difficult con-
text. The need now is to continue – how-
ever cautiously – along that path and at 
same time to signal to the Russian people 
that the EU remains genuinely interested 
in engaging with them. 
Germany and the EU will also have to 
ready themselves for increasing emigration 
from Russia and Belarus. These people will 
need support. But they – like the Russian 
community in general – can also be impor-
tant interlocutors and potential communi-
cators into Russian society. People-to-people 
contacts with Russia were abruptly inter-
rupted by the pandemic, and will remain 
difficult even after it is overcome. The ques-
tion of visa-free travel for Russian citizens 
has long been a bone of contention within 
the EU. It now becomes crucial in order to 
maintain at least minimal direct contact 
with Russian society. 
Dr. Sabine Fischer is Senior Fellow in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division. 
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